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Humanitarian Financial 
Intervention
Evan J. Criddle* 
Abstract
Over the past several decades, states have used international asset freezes with increasing 
frequency as a mechanism for promoting human rights abroad. Yet the international law gov-
erning this mechanism, which I refer to as ‘humanitarian financial intervention’, remains 
fragmented. This article offers the first systematic legal analysis of  humanitarian financial 
intervention. It identifies six humanitarian purposes that states may pursue through asset 
freezes: preserving foreign assets from misappropriation, incapacitating foreign states or 
foreign nationals, coercing foreign states or foreign nationals to forsake abusive practices, 
compensating victims, ameliorating humanitarian crises through humanitarian aid or post-
conflict reconstruction, and punishing human rights violators. Whether intervening states 
may pursue these objectives in any given context depends upon the interplay between several 
international legal regimes, including international investment law, collective-security agree-
ments such as the UN Charter, the customary law of  countermeasures, the law of  armed con-
flict, and customary law governing the enforcement of  judicial decisions. By disentangling 
the various international legal regimes that govern humanitarian financial intervention, 
this article furnishes a preliminary road map for evaluating the legality of  past, present, and 
future financial interventions – including asset freezes directed against the Qaddafi regime 
during the 2011 Libyan Revolution.
1 Introduction
For a generation of  international lawyers who came of  age during the 1980s and 
1990s, the words ‘humanitarian intervention’ call to mind images of  NATO bombers 
over Kosovo, US Marines in Haiti and Panama, and blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers in 
Somalia and East Timor. Scholarly commentary on the law and ethics of  humanitar-
ian intervention has focused almost exclusively on the threat or use of  force in mili-
tary and peacekeeping operations. Over the past several decades, however, states have 
developed a variety of  other tools for advancing human rights abroad. These tools 
include non-forcible measures such as asset freezes, arms embargoes, travel bans, 
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and the suspension of  diplomatic relations. Among these alternatives to military 
force, asset freezes have become the international community’s preferred response 
to humanitarian crises. Because asset freezes, as purely economic measures, do not 
involve the ‘use of  force’ under Article 2(4) of  the UN Charter,1 they sidestep some of  
the thorny legal and ethical issues associated with military intervention. Nonetheless, 
international asset freezes qualify as a form of  ‘humanitarian intervention’ to the 
extent that states freezing foreign assets (‘host states’) purposefully interfere in the 
domestic affairs of  a foreign state (the ‘target state’), undermining the target state’s 
political independence and transgressing legal protections for the fair and equitable 
treatment of  foreign investment, in order to promote cosmopolitan humanitarian val-
ues abroad.2
This article offers the first systematic legal analysis of  humanitarian financial inter-
vention. I argue that there are at least six distinct humanitarian objectives that host 
states may pursue through international asset freezes: preservation, incapacitation, 
coercion, compensation, amelioration, and punishment. Whether host states may 
pursue any particular humanitarian objective in a given context depends upon the 
interplay between several discrete strands of  international law. Generally speaking, 
customary norms prohibiting foreign ‘intervention’ and protecting foreign invest-
ment from ‘expropriation’ prevent host states from singling out the assets of  foreign 
states or foreign nationals for a discriminatory asset freeze without their consent. 
Hence, when host states impose asset freezes for humanitarian purposes, they bear a 
special burden of  establishing that international law affirmatively authorizes foreign 
intervention into the political and economic affairs of  a target state in contravention 
of  ordinary protections for foreign investment. Host states may satisfy this burden by 
linking humanitarian asset freezes to one of  four lex specialis regimes. First, collective-
security agreements such as the UN Charter permit states to freeze foreign assets as 
authorized by the UN Security Council or a comparable regional body. Secondly, under 
the customary international law of  countermeasures, states may freeze the assets of  
target states that violate obligations erga omnes to respect fundamental human rights. 
Thirdly, when states undertake humanitarian military intervention, they may freeze 
foreign assets pursuant to the law of  armed conflict. Fourthly, customary international 
law permits states to freeze foreign assets for the enforcement of  judicial decisions. 
1 Although some states might be tempted to argue that international asset freezes violate the UN Charter’s 
prohibition against the use of  force, the inclusion of  economic measures within Art. 2(4) was debated 
and soundly rejected by a vote of  26–2 during the drafting of  the Charter: see Chayes, ‘Nicaragua, the 
United States, and the World Court’, 85 Columbia L Rev (1985) 1445, at 1463 n. 89; Elagab, ‘Economic 
Measures Against Developing Countries’, 41 Int’l & Comp LQ (1992) 682, at 688.
2 See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of  Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of  States and the Protection 
of  Their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131 (XX) (21 Dec. 1965), at paras 1–2 (hereinafter 
the ‘Declaration on Intervention’); Declaration on Principles of  International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of  the United Nations, GA Res. 
2625 (XXV) (24 Oct. 1970) (hereinafter the ‘Friendly Relations Declaration’); Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits, Judgment [1986] ICJ Rep 14, at 101–103, 
paras 191–192, 202–203. Although the term ‘humanitarian financial intervention’ may encompass 
other measures such as bankrolling a foreign insurgency to undermine a repressive regime: see Nicaragua, 
supra, at paras 195, 205, 242, such measures are beyond the scope of  this article.
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Whenever states freeze foreign assets for humanitarian purposes, they must ground 
their intervention in one of  these four lex specialis regimes, while respecting funda-
mental norms enshrined in international human rights law (HRL) and international 
humanitarian law (IHL).
By weaving together the various strands of  international law that govern humani-
tarian financial intervention, this article furnishes an integrated framework for evalu-
ating the legality of  past, present, and future financial interventions. To illustrate the 
practical value of  this framework, the article examines the framework’s application 
to a series of  controversies that arose during the 2011 Libyan Revolution, when the 
international community froze roughly US$160 billion in assets belonging to individ-
uals and entities associated with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.3 Although these 
asset freezes enjoyed broad international support, international lawyers and diplomats 
openly debated whether (or how) the frozen assets could be used to advance humani-
tarian objectives in Libya. Most experts agreed that the Security Council could use 
Libya’s frozen assets as a negotiating chip to persuade the Qaddafi regime to forsake 
its violent attacks against peaceful civilian demonstrators. Whether international law 
would support other humanitarian objectives was less clear. For example, could host 
states leverage Libya’s frozen assets to force Colonel Qaddafi to relinquish power? Could 
they liquidate the assets to purchase humanitarian aid for Libyan civilians, compensate 
foreign victims of  Libyan terrorism, or purchase arms for Libya’s fledgling Transitional 
National Council (TNC)? Facing a dizzying array of  policy alternatives, some host states 
dug in their heels, rejecting all invitations to release frozen assets pending further action 
by the Security Council.4 Others proceeded to unfreeze Libyan assets without awaiting 
Security Council approval.5 Notably absent from these debates was a rigorous account 
of  the international legal regimes that govern humanitarian financial intervention.
This article concludes that international law supports key features of  the interna-
tional community’s humanitarian financial intervention in Libya, but it also offers 
grounds for criticizing how some states administered – or proposed to administer – 
asset freezes against the Qaddafi regime. In accordance with conventional wisdom, 
the article confirms that the Security Council’s mandatory sanctions regime against 
Libya (Resolutions 1970 and 1973) was consistent with international law, supersed-
ing the customary principle of  non-intervention.6 Asset freezes imposed by the US and 
the EU without prior Security Council authorization also constituted lawful responses 
to the Qaddafi regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity. On the other hand, 
this article raises the possibility that France, Italy, and Turkey might have violated 
3 See Meyers and Balefsky, ‘UN Releases $1.5 Billion in Frozen Qaddafi Assets to Aid Rebuilding of  
Libya’, NY Times, 25 Aug. 2011, available at: www.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/world/africa/26assets.
html?pagewanted=all.
4 E.g., Global Civilians for Peace in Libya, ‘Russia: France Has No Authority To Give Libya Money to Rebels’, 
8 Mar. 2011, available at: http://globalciviliansforpeace.com/2011/08/03/russia-france-has-no-
authority-to-give-libyan-money-to-he-rebels (Russia).
5 E.g., ibid. (France).
6 See UN Charter Art. 2(7) (exempting ‘enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ from the prohibition 
against intervention); SC Res. 1970, S/RES/1970 (26 Feb. 2011); SC Res. 1973, S/RES/1973 (17 Mar. 
2011).
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international law by releasing frozen assets to the TNC without Security Council 
authorization, and it rejects proposals advanced by American and French officials dur-
ing the summer of  2011 for the redistribution of  Libyan assets to foreign governments 
and victims of  Libyan terrorism. The international community’s asset freezes against 
the Qaddafi regime thus illustrate both the promise and the limits of  state authority to 
promote human rights through international financial intervention.
2 The Humanitarian Objectives of  International Financial 
Intervention
The basic mechanics of  international financial intervention are straightforward: 
state regulators direct financial institutions to freeze assets of  a foreign state or for-
eign nationals. Once assets have been frozen, they may not be paid out, withdrawn, 
transferred, or set off  without the host state’s permission. States frequently combine 
asset freezes with other measures such as blocking a target state from obtaining loans, 
credit, interest payments, transfer payments, and international aid – all in an effort 
to limit the target state’s access to foreign capital. In some contexts, humanitarian 
financial intervention terminates when a host state ‘unfreezes’ foreign accounts, per-
mitting investors to recover their assets. In other contexts, a host state might decide 
instead to redirect frozen assets toward compensating domestic judgment creditors 
or funding humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction within the target state.
Although states have employed international asset freezes for decades, they rarely 
articulate their objectives with precision, and the international community has yet 
to develop a consistent vocabulary for distinguishing the various purposes that asset 
freezes may serve in international relations. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
underscored these concerns in a 1995 position paper, ‘Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace’, when he lamented that the Security Council’s objectives for sanctions have 
‘not always been clearly defined’ and, indeed, ‘sometimes seem to change with time. 
This combination of  imprecision and mutability makes it difficult for the Security 
Council to agree on when the objectives [of  financial sanctions] can be considered to 
have been achieved and sanctions can be lifted.’7
Close scrutiny of  state practice suggests that states have employed targeted asset 
freezes for at least six distinct humanitarian purposes: preservation, incapacitation, 
coercion, compensation, amelioration, and punishment. While these purposes are by 
no means mutually exclusive, the decision to prioritize one objective over another may 
have important consequences for the administration of  frozen assets.
A Preservation
On some occasions, host states have frozen foreign assets to preserve them from mis-
appropriation or spoliation. For example, shortly after the outbreak of  World War II, 
7 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of  the Secretary-General on the Occasion of  the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of  the United Nations, at para. 68, UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1 (1995) (hereinafter 
‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’).
 at EJIL m
em








Humanitarian Financial Intervention 587
many countries in North and South America froze the assets of  Denmark and Norway 
to ensure that those assets would not fall into the hands of  Nazi Germany.8 Some of  
these measures remained in place for decades as host states sought assurances that 
frozen assets would return in an orderly fashion to the original investors.9 In 1990, 
many states took similar precautionary measures in response to Iraq’s invasion of  
Kuwait, freezing accounts to ensure that Kuwait’s assets would remain intact pending 
the expulsion of  Iraq’s military.10 In other contexts, international asset freezes have 
been used to combat public corruption, preserving a target state’s national patrimony 
to ensure that misappropriated public funds would be available to advance interna-
tional human rights for a foreign people.11 In each of  these settings, international 
intervention ensured that frozen assets would remain available to promote human 
rights.
B Incapacitation
International financial intervention may also advance human rights by restrict-
ing a target state’s access to resources that could be used to advance pernicious 
policies. During World War II, many states froze the offshore assets of  Axis powers 
to limit their capacity for military aggression.12 More recently, states have endeav-
oured to combat international terrorism, narco-trafficking, and nuclear prolifera-
tion by imposing financial sanctions against renegade non-state actors and their 
state sponsors.13 While some of  these examples arguably fall outside the scope 
of  ‘humanitarian intervention’, they illustrate how targeted asset freezes may be 
used to limit the destructive capacity of  human rights violators abroad. Even when 
international asset freezes do not render foreign actors financially incapable of  vio-
lating human rights, they may shift the political dynamic within a target state, 
empowering rights-respecting factions to introduce reforms that would narrow 
the legal authority and practical capacity of  state and non-state actors to violate 
human rights.
C Coercion
A third potential objective of  international financial sanctions is coercion: by freez-
ing foreign accounts, host states acquire a powerful bargaining chip that they may 
8 Domke, ‘Western Hemisphere Control over Enemy Property: A Comparative Survey’, 11 L & Contemp 
Prob (1945) 3, at 4.
9 See Newcomb, ‘Office of  Foreign Asset Control’, in R.R. Newcomb, Coping with US Export Controls 1994 
(Practising Law Institute Commercial Law and Practice Handbook Series No. 705, 1994), at 397, 411.
10 Ibid., at 409–411.
11 See e.g., ‘Swiss Freeze $1bn in Gaddafi, Mubarak, Ben Ali Assets’, BBC News Middle East, 3 May 2011, 
available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13264931.
12 See Sommerich, ‘A Brief  About Confiscation’, 11 L & Contemp Prob (1945) 152, at 152.
13 See Staibano, ‘Trends in UN Sanctions: From ad hoc Practice to Institutional Capacity Building’, in 
P. Wallensteen and C. Staibano (eds), International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System 
(2005), at 31, 41–42.
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use to extract humanitarian concessions from a foreign state.14 States have imposed 
coercive asset freezes for a variety of  humanitarian purposes, including facilitating 
the release of  American hostages in Iran, securing reparations for victims of  Libyan 
terrorist attacks, and incentivizing target states to accept human rights monitors.15 
Asset freezes have pressured states to abandon the pursuit of  nuclear weapons, sever 
ties with drug cartels and terrorist organizations, and reinstate democratically elected 
governments.16 Experience suggests that coercive asset freezes often fail to achieve 
their objectives due to tepid enforcement among participating host states and target 
states’ unwavering commitment to repressive policies. Whether coercive asset freezes 
can be employed successfully to promote human rights abroad will naturally depend, 
as well, upon the relative value of  a target state’s frozen assets and whether the target 
state is reliant upon these resources to advance its core interests.
D Compensation
Fourthly, states have employed asset freezes to secure compensation for victims of  
human rights abuse abroad. Compensatory asset freezes differ from coercive asset 
freezes to the extent that they do not seek to compel a target state to act or refrain 
from acting in any particular manner. Instead, compensatory asset freezes bypass 
a foreign state’s volition entirely, using frozen assets to secure remedies for vic-
tims of  the target state – typically without the target state’s consent. Such was 
the case, for example, when US courts froze assets of  former-Philippine President 
Ferdinand Marcos to ensure that victims of  human rights abuse in the Philippines 
could obtain compensation in civil actions.17 Similarly, assets frozen during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis and Iran Hostage Crisis have been used to satisfy civil judg-
ments against Cuba and Iran for human rights violations such as extrajudicial kill-
ing, kidnapping, and torture.18 Thus, international asset freezes may ensure that 
targets states cannot escape their legal obligation to provide remedies for human 
rights violations.
14 As employed throughout this article, the term ‘coercion’ has a narrower meaning than is typical in inter-
national law and international relations scholarship. While all financial interventions are ‘coercive’ in 
the broad sense that they interfere with a target state’s administration of  its own resources, only some 
financial interventions are ‘coercive’ in the narrower sense contemplated here, in that they aspire to 
induce a target state to satisfy its human rights obligations.
15 See Carswell and Davis, ‘The Economic and Financial Pressures: Freeze and Sanctions’, in C. Warren 
et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of  a Crisis (1985), at 173, 177; O’Harrow and Grimaldi, 
‘Libyan Gold Rush Followed End to Sanctions’. Washington Post, 25 May 2011, available at: www.
washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/libyan-gold-rush-followed-end-to-sanctions/2011/05/25/
AGGgbVBH_story.html.
16 See, e.g., SC Res. 1737, S/RES/1737, pmbl and paras 3–12 (27 Dec. 2006); Staibano, supra note 13, at 
41.
17 See Hilao v. Estate of  Marcos, 103 F 3d 762 (9th Cir. 1996).
18 E.g., Alejandre v. Republic of  Cuba, 996 F Supp 1239 (SD Fla. 1997); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of  Iran, 18 F 
Supp 2d. 62 (DDC 1998); see generally J.K. Elsea, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Suits 
Against Terrorist States by Victims of  Terrorism (8 Aug. 2008), at 8–9, 69, available at: www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/terror/RL31258.pdf.
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E Amelioration
A fifth humanitarian objective that states have pursued through international asset 
freezes is the amelioration of  humanitarian crises. Ameliorative financial interven-
tion, like compensatory intervention, involves the redistribution of  a target state’s 
resources without its consent. Rather than focus on remediating past human rights 
violations, however, ameliorative intervention involves the unfreezing of  a target 
state’s assets to address conditions that continue to threaten human rights. For 
example, host states might use frozen assets to purchase food, construct tempo-
rary shelter, or deliver medical care to internally displaced persons within a target 
state. Alternatively, frozen assets might be directed toward post-conflict reconstruc-
tion such as rebuilding roads and schools. These ameliorative objectives have been 
invoked on several occasions when the international community has imposed asset 
freezes against Iraq. During the early 1990s, when the Iraqi government refused 
to use its oil revenues to address severe shortages of  food and medicine within its 
borders, the Security Council directed UN-member states to freeze and transfer Iraqi 
assets into an international escrow account for ‘the provision of  humanitarian relief  
in Iraq’.19 Coalition forces imposed similar measures when they returned to Iraq 
ten years later, sequestering the assets of  Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party to ensure 
that these resources would be available to address ‘urgent humanitarian relief  and 
reconstruction requirements’.20 While these examples are unusual in a variety of  
respects, they illustrate how international asset freezes may be employed to amelio-
rate humanitarian crises abroad.
F Punishment
Lastly, host states may seek to freeze foreign assets to punish target states or individual 
foreign nationals for violating human rights. International asset freezes have expres-
sive power as a signal that the international community condemns a target state’s 
behaviour. In theory, asset freezes may also enable the international community to 
inflict retribution upon target states for past human rights violations and deter future 
violations. Indeed, US officials frequently characterize international asset freezes as 
‘punitive’, emphasizing both deterrence and retribution as important objectives.21 
Punitive asset freezes are distinct from coercive asset freezes, for present purposes, 
because their primary purpose is not to compel a human rights violator to change its 
current practices but rather to bolster the rule of  law by imposing a penalty for past 
violations and discouraging future violations.
* * *
19 SC Res. 778, pmble and para. 5(c)(ii), S/RES/778 (2 Oct. 1992).
20 Walerstein, ‘Coping with Combat Claims: An Analysis of  the Foreign Claim Act’s Combat Exclusion’, 11 
Cardozo J Conflict Resolution (2009) 319, at 340 (quoting Paul Bremer).
21 See Newcomb, supra note 9, at 412 (characterizing financial sanctions against Iran in 1979 as ‘puni-
tive’); Garmise, ‘The Iraqi Claims Process and the Ghost of  Versailles’, 67 NYU L Rev (1992) 840, at 
841 n. 11 (noting US officials’ contention ‘that severe punishment of  Iraq [through financial sanctions] 
would serve as a deterrent to other countries’).
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In the past, state regulators have tended to characterize all international asset freezes as 
‘coercive’,22 or have divided asset freezes into two categories: ‘protective’ and ‘punitive’.23 
The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that these traditional categories do not cap-
ture the full range of  options for humanitarian financial intervention. While coercive asset 
freezes are a common response to human rights crises, they are not the only conceivable 
response; host states may also freeze foreign assets to incapacitate a repressive regime, 
secure compensation for victims, or fund the procurement and distribution of  humanitar-
ian aid abroad. In all, there are at least six distinct options that host states may consider 
when they freeze foreign assets for humanitarian purposes: preservation, incapacitation, 
coercion, compensation, amelioration, and coercion.24 To be sure, states could have other 
reasons for freezing foreign assets, including the desire to focus international attention on 
a global problem, provide moral support to political allies, or lay the groundwork for mili-
tary action.25 The international community’s reasons for freezing a target state’s assets 
are often multi-faceted and may evolve over time as circumstances change. Nonetheless, 
whenever states use international asset freezes as a tool for human-rights promotion, their 
humanitarian objectives are likely to fall into one or more of  these six categories.
3 The International Law of  Humanitarian Financial 
Intervention
Does international law permit states to freeze foreign assets for all six of  these humani-
tarian objectives? In the discussion that follows, I seek to answer this question by sur-
veying the various international legal regimes that govern international asset freezes. 
As with any exercise in legal cartography, some nuances of  the legal terrain receive 
only passing consideration, inviting further elaboration in future scholarship. To the 
extent that the legal norms governing asset freezes require further clarification or 
refinement, the following sections identify significant gaps and ambiguities while sug-
gesting tentative strategies for progressive development. What emerges over the course 
of  this discussion is a serviceable roadmap that states and international organizations 
may use to navigate the international law of  humanitarian financial intervention.
A Asset Freezes as International Intervention
Humanitarian asset freezes require special legal justification because they represent a 
form of  ‘dictatorial interference’ that violates general principles of  international legal 
22 See, e.g., Watson Institute for International Studies, Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manual for Design and 
Implementation, Contribution from the Interlaken Process (2001), at ix, available at: www.seco.admin.ch/
themen/00513/00620/00639/00641/index.html?lang=en.
23 See, e.g., Newcomb, supra note 9, at 656.
24 Some asset freezes within these categories might not constitute ‘humanitarian’ measures, strictly speak-
ing. For example, asset freezes designed to disrupt transnational drug cartels (incapacitation) or deter 
target states from developing nuclear weapons (coercion) would bear only a highly attenuated connec-
tion to international human rights.
25 See G.C. Hufbauer and J.J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (1985), at 
4–10.
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order.26 There are at least two possible paths one might take to explain why interna-
tional asset freezes constitute a prima facie wrong under international law. Both paths 
lead to the conclusion that states may not freeze foreign assets for humanitarian pur-
poses without furnishing an affirmative legal justification.
One account, which I will call the ‘anti-subordination theory’, holds that any 
measures used to subordinate a state’s sovereign powers to foreign control – includ-
ing international asset freezes – constitute acts of  wrongful ‘intervention’. When 
host states freeze foreign assets to incapacitate a target state, coerce a target state to 
change its policies, direct the allocation of  a target state’s resources, or punish a tar-
get state or its nationals for human rights violations abroad, they assert dictatorial 
control over ‘matters which are essentially within [the other state’s] domestic jurisdic-
tion.’27 As Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch has observed,28 such non-forcible interfer-
ence arguably transgresses customary principles of  external self-determination and 
non-intervention that are embedded in the UN Charter,29 affirmed in soft-law instru-
ments such as the UN General Assembly’s Declarations on Intervention30 and Friendly 
Relations,31 and endorsed in binding regional agreements in Africa,32 the Americas,33 
and Europe.34 The text of  the Charter of  the Organization of  American States captures 
the spirit of  these instruments:
No State or group of  States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of  any other State. The foregoing principle prohib-
its not only armed force but also any other form of  interference or attempted threat against the 
personality of  the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.35
While international law has yet to articulate with precision when non-forcible actions 
rise to the level of  ‘intervention’, asset freezes that are designed to incapacitate, coerce, 
supplant, or punish a foreign state arguably bear the hallmarks of  an objectionable 
‘interference or attempted threat’. On this reading, the fact that a host state operates 
exclusively within its own territorial jurisdiction when it freezes foreign assets does not 
absolve it of  international responsibility because the purpose and effect of  its actions 
26 See S. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (1996), at 10 
(‘most writers on the topic of  intervention narrow the concept to some form of  objectionable or “dictato-
rial” interference in the affairs of  a state’).
27 UN Charter, Art. 2(7).
28 See Damrosch, ‘Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic 
Affairs’, 83 AJIL (1989) 1, at 6–13.
29 See UN Charter, Arts 1(2), 2(1), and 55.
30 Declaration on Intervention, supra note 2; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 101–103, paras 191–192, 202–204 (characterizing this principle as custom-
ary international law).
31 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 2.
32 Organization of  African Unity, Charter, 25 May 1963, 2 ILM (1963) 766, Art. III.
33 Charter of  the Organization of  American States, 30 Apr. 1948, 2 UST 2394, TIAS No. 2361, 119 UNTS 
3, Arts 18 and 19 (hereinafter the ‘OAS Charter’).
34 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act (Helsinki Accord), 1 Aug. 1975, 73 Dep’t 
St. Bull. 323 (1975), reprinted at 14 ILM (1975) 1292, Principle VI (Non-Intervention in Internal 
Affairs).
35 OAS Charter, supra note 33, Art. 18.
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are transparently interventionist: to subordinate a foreign state and its assets to the 
host state’s superintendent power.
Some might contend that the anti-subordination theory casts too broad a net. 
Arguably, the international prohibition against ‘intervention’ does not preclude states 
from engaging in otherwise lawful acts of  retorsion, such as the withdrawal of  foreign 
aid or the suspension of  diplomatic relations, simply because these measures might 
compromise a target state’s sovereign interests. From the perspective of  international 
law, acts of  retorsion are wholly unobjectionable when their purpose is to encour-
age respect for fundamental human rights – an area where states lack legal discretion 
to chart a different course. On this second account of  the prohibition against inter-
vention, which I will call the ‘wrongful means theory’, only acts that are prima facie 
wrongful under international law (e.g., armed attacks, breaches of  trade agreements) 
constitute wrongful ‘intervention’.
Even under the wrongful means theory, international asset freezes qualify as ‘inter-
vention’. Discriminatory asset freezes are a form of  wrongful ‘expropriation’ because 
they deprive investors of  the right to manage, use, and effectively control their prop-
erty. When host states impose such measures on foreign investment, customary inter-
national law requires them to satisfy the ‘international minimum standard’ of  ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’.36 Although the precise content of  this customary obligation 
remains controversial, international tribunals have understood the minimum stan-
dard to include respect for due process (e.g., access to justice, non-arbitrariness) and 
good faith (e.g., consistency, transparency, non-arbitrariness, respecting reasonable 
expectations).37
Over the past decade, a number of  states have attracted criticism for failing to com-
ply with these standards when they have frozen the property of  alleged terrorist org-
anizations and their alleged supporters. At the same time, but with less fanfare, states 
also have neglected these safeguards when they have imposed asset freezes against 
foreign states and foreign nationals for humanitarian purposes. When foreign nation-
als find their investments targeted for humanitarian asset freezes, they typically have 
no access to formal procedural mechanisms for challenging their designations and 
reclaiming their assets. Moreover, states have yet to promulgate formal criteria for 
selecting targets, raising concerns about inconsistency, inadequate transparency, and 
the potential for arbitrary decision-making. Aside from these requirements of  ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’, international asset freezes frequently violate other standards 
established in bilateral investment treaties such as the requirements of  ‘national treat-
ment’, ‘most-favoured-nation treatment’, ‘full protection and security’, and the right 
to transfer assets. In short, judged against the prevailing standards for the protec-
tion of  foreign investment, international asset freezes typically constitute prima facie 
36 See OECD, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law’, Sept. 2004, avail-
able at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf  (last visited 22 June 2012) (citing tribunal deci-
sions); Schwebel, ‘The Influence of  Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law’, 98 
ASIL Proceedings (2004) 27.
37 Ibid., at 27–36.
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wrongful means – measures that require affirmative justification under international 
law.38
Some international asset freezes do not qualify as ‘intervention’ under either the 
anti-subordination theory or the wrongful means theory. Consider, for example, a host 
state that prevents foreign assets from falling into the hands of  a predacious occupy-
ing power (e.g., Iraq in Kuwait) or freezes the accounts of  a foreign official to return 
public funds misappropriated through corruption (e.g., former Nigerian dictator Sani 
Ambacha). In contexts such as these, a host state could justify financial intervention 
based upon either (1) a foreign state’s express consent to protection, where applicable, 
or (2) a legal presumption that foreign investors tacitly consent to preservative regula-
tory action when they place their assets within a host state’s jurisdiction.39 On either 
account, a host state that preserves foreign assets from misappropriation could not 
be accused of  ‘dictatorial interference’ or ‘unfair and inequitable treatment’ in any 
meaningful sense.
Of  course, such consent-based asset freezes are relatively rare. More often than not, 
states that freeze foreign assets to promote human rights abroad do so in the face of  a 
target state’s sustained and bitter resistance. The question in most contexts, therefore, 
is whether the prima facie wrongfulness of  such measures can be redeemed by the host 
state’s reliance upon superseding norms of  international lex specialis. The burden of  
demonstrating that such norms exist and apply to a particular context rests upon the 
states that undertake humanitarian financial intervention.
B Authorizing Humanitarian Financial Intervention
International law does permit states to use asset freezes to promote human rights 
abroad, but only under limited circumstances. A state that singles out foreign 
assets for a targeted freeze without the target state’s consent must ground its 
intervention in one of  four distinct international legal regimes: collective-secu-
rity agreements, the law of  countermeasures, the law of  armed conflict, or cus-
tomary law governing the enforcement of  judicial decisions. Each of  these legal 
regimes is unique and warrants independent consideration. Analysed collectively, 
however, they comprise an integrated legal framework for humanitarian financial 
intervention.
1. Collective-security Agreements
Some international asset freezes derive their legal authority from collective-
security agreements that authorize intervention for humanitarian purposes. The 
pre-eminent example is the UN Charter, which allows the Security Council to 
38 Some BITs permit derogation from ordinary investment protections as necessary to fulfil their ‘obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of  international peace or security, or the protection of  
[their] own essential security interests’: see US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Art. 18, available at: 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
39 See Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art. 20, GA Res. 56/83, UN Doc. A/
RES/56/83, Annex (12 Dec. 2001) (hereinafter the ‘DARSIWA’).
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coordinate multilateral asset freezes and other non-forcible sanctions to address 
‘any threat to the peace, breach of  peace, or act of  aggression’.40 Beginning with 
Iraq’s invasion of  Kuwait in 1990,41 the Security Council has imposed financial 
sanctions against states and non-state actors in many countries – often in an 
effort to promote human rights observance.42 Some regional agreements also 
provide for coordinated intervention. For example, the Constitutive Act of  the 
African Union empowers its Assembly of  Heads of  State and Government to 
green-light intervention in response to ‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity’ or an affirmative request from a member state ‘to restore peace and 
security’.43 Other instruments such as the Treaty of  Guarantee Between the 
Republic of  Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey (the ‘Treaty of  
Guarantee’),44 and the 1993 Cotonou Agreement for the resolution of  hostili-
ties in Liberia45 likewise contemplate third-state intervention to address systemic 
human rights abuses. When states become parties to agreements such as these, 
they effectively authorize other states to serve as secondary guarantors for the 
human rights of  their own people.
Pursuant to its authority under Chapter VII of  the UN Charter, the Security Council 
has imposed asset freezes for a variety of  humanitarian objectives. Although the 
Security Council rarely articulates its objectives with precision, it has pursued at least 
five of  the six humanitarian objectives identified in this article: preservation, inca-
pacitation, coercion, compensation, and amelioration.46 Few contemporary observers 
would dispute that the Security Council possesses the authority to approve interna-
tional financial intervention for these purposes when such measures are necessary to 
promote international peace and security.
The one humanitarian objective that the Security Council has disavowed consis-
tently is the use of  financial sanctions as punishment.47 Whether the Charter confers 
punitive powers on the Security Council has been a subject of  considerable academic 
40 UN Charter, Arts 39, 41.
41 See SC Res. 661, at para. 4, S/RES/661 (6 Aug. 1990).
42 E.g., SC Res. 1975, at para. 12, S/RES/1975 (30 Mar. 2011) (Côte d’Ivoire).
43 Constitutive Act of  the African Union, Arts 4(h), 4(j), 11 July 2000, 2158 UNTS 3; see also biid., Art. 
23(2) (discussing regional sanctions). But see OAS Charter, supra note 33, Arts 18 and 19 (prohibiting 
regional economic intervention).
44 Treaty of  Guarantee, Cyprus–Greece–UK–Turkey, Arts 2, 3, 16 Aug. 1960, 382 UNTS 4.
45 Cotonou Agreement, Art. 8(3), 25 July 1993, IGNU-NPFL-ULIMO, attached to UN SC, Letter dated 6 
Aug. 1993, from the Chargé d’Affaires A.I. of  the Permanent Mission of  Benin to the UN Addressed to 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/26272 (1993).
46 See, e.g., SC Res. 1532, at para. 1, S/RES/1532 (12 Mar. 2004) (preservation, incapacitation); SC Res. 
1343, at para. 2(d), S/RES/1343 (7 Mar. 2001) (incapacitation); SC Res. 1737, supra note 16, pmble and 
paras 3–12 (coercion); SC Res. 674, at para. 9, S/RES/674 (29 Oct. 1990) (compensation); SC Res. 778, 
supra note 19, pmble and para. 5(c)(ii) (amelioration).
47 See, e.g., Letter dated 2 Sept. 2005 from the Chairman of  the SC Committee established pursuant to Res. 
1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to 
the President of  the SC, at paras 41–42, UN Doc. S/2005/572 (9 Sept. 2005), available at: http://dac-
cess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/407/94/PDFN0540794.pdf?OpenElement; cf. Supplement 
to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 7, at para. 66.
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debate.48 Given the Security Council’s steadfast refusal to characterize its financial 
sanctions as punitive, however, states would be wise to apply a strong presumption 
against construing Security Council resolutions to authorize punitive financial sanc-
tions. According to this presumption, states may not invoke the UN Charter or other 
collective-security agreements to justify imposing punitive sanctions against foreign 
states or foreign nationals in the absence of  express authorization from the Security 
Council or a comparable regional organization.
2. The Law of  Countermeasures
Humanitarian financial intervention generally will be most effective when the 
Security Council requires all UN member states to participate in coordinated finan-
cial sanctions.49 In some contexts, however, the Security Council has been unable to 
respond to humanitarian crises due to entrenched political opposition or intractable 
disagreement about the best way to structure multilateral sanctions. Gridlock in the 
Security Council may undermine the effectiveness of  multilateral financial interven-
tion by enabling target states to move their offshore assets to safe havens. In an era of  
electronic banking, when assets travel across borders at the click of  a mouse, even the 
slightest delay in multilateral coordination may have profound consequences.
Fortunately, collective-security agreements such as the UN Charter are not the only 
source of  legal authorization for international financial sanctions. Even in the absence 
of  authorization from the Security Council or a comparable regional organization, 
states are free to impose targeted asset freezes in response to human rights abuses 
abroad, provided that they ground their financial intervention in one of  three alter-
native sources of  international law: the law of  countermeasures, the law of  armed 
conflict, or customary law governing the enforcement of  judicial decisions.
The primary alternative to treaty-based collective-security regimes is the custom-
ary international law of  countermeasures. The term ‘countermeasures’ refers to ‘the 
act of  non-compliance, by a State, with its obligations owed to another State, decided 
in response to a prior breach of  international law by that other State and aimed at 
inducing it to respect its obligations’.50 As the International Law Commission (ILC) 
has recognized in its Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles on State Responsibility) and its Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of  International Organizations, customary international law permits 
states and regional organizations to freeze foreign assets, suspend trade agreements, 
48 Some legal scholars have argued that the Charter does not authorize punitive sanctions. See, e.g., 
E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of  Countermeasures (1984), at 70. This argument has 
become less persuasive since the 1990s as the SC has invoked its Charter powers to establish ad hoc crimi-
nal tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR. See SC Res. 827, S/RES/827 (25 May 1993); SC Res. 955, 
S/RES/955 (8 Nov. 1994). Arguably, the Charter authorizes the SC to impose punitive financial sanctions 
as necessary ‘to maintain or restore international peace and security’: UN Charter, Arts 39, 41.
49 See Bapat and Morgan, ‘Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data’, 
53 Int’l Stud Q (2009) 1075.
50 C.J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), at 19–20; see also Case Concerning 
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 1, at paras 82–87; Air Services 
Agreement Case (France v. United States), 18 RIAA (1978) 416, at para. 83.
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and impose other non-forcible measures as necessary to address another state’s 
breach of  international law.51 These countermeasures constitute a form of  ‘permitted 
self-help’ that compensates for the dearth of  centralized institutions capable of  con-
sistently enforcing states’ international legal obligations.52
In the past, some courts and publicists have conceptualized countermeasures in 
exclusively bilateral terms, asserting that states lack standing to impose countermea-
sures unless they have suffered a direct injury. This bilateral approach would preclude 
third states from imposing countermeasures in response to human rights abuses 
against foreign nationals abroad.53 Support for this approach has eroded over the past 
several decades, however, in favour of  a broader conception of  third-state standing.54 
In the celebrated Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ appeared to endorse third-state coun-
termeasures when it embraced the concept of  obligations erga omnes, observing that 
some international obligations are owed to all members of  the international commu-
nity.55 Following the ICJ’s lead, the ILC accepted the general concept of  obligations erga 
omnes in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility,56 although it ultimately declined to 
decide whether the concept would support third-state countermeasures.57
Recent studies by Martin Dawidowicz and Christian Tams make a persuasive case that 
state practice and opinio juris support third-state countermeasures for violations of  erga 
omnes norms.58 Dawidowicz and Tams demonstrate that states have imposed third-party 
countermeasures for humanitarian purposes in dozens of  incidents over the past several 
decades.59 This growing body of  state practice has involved states from around the world,60 
and it has elicited scant opposition from disinterested states.61 Thus, just as financial sanc-
tions have become a standard feature of  the Security Council’s response to humanitarian 
crises, third-state countermeasures have become firmly embedded in state practice and 
opinio juris as a lawful mechanism for responding to breaches of  obligations erga omnes.
When states freeze assets as a humanitarian countermeasure, their discretion is circum-
scribed by a variety of  legal constraints. The law of  countermeasures does not authorize 
51 See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Arts 49–54; International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of  International Organizations, Art. 22, 2 Yrbk Int’l L Comm (2011).
52 Tams, supra note 50, at 19.
53 See South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase [1966] ICJ Rep 
6, at paras 40–47 (18 July); H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law (1955), at 312–323.
54 See Charney, ‘Third State Responsibilities in International Law’, 10 Michigan J Int’l L (1989) 57, at 59.
55 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase [1970] ICJ Rep 3, at paras 33–34 
(5 Feb.).
56 See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 48(1)(b).
57 Ibid., at Art. 54 and comments.
58 Dawidowicz, ‘Public Law Enforcement Without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of  State Practice on 
Third-Party Countermeasures and Their Relationship to the UN Security Council’, 77 British Yrbk Int’l L 
(2007) 333; Tams, supra note 50.
59 Ibid., at 231.
60 Ibid., at 235–237.
61 Even during the ILC’s ultimately inconclusive debates over the customary status of  third-state counter-
measures, the vast majority of  states supported the inclusion of  a more robust statement in the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility with only a handful (principally, Japan) offering sustained opposition. See 
Tams, supra note 50, at 243–246.
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state regulators to appropriate, transfer, or otherwise effect a permanent deprivation of  
frozen assets.62 Hence, states may not freeze frozen assets to incapacitate or punish foreign 
states,63 nor may they unilaterally divert frozen assets into victim compensation funds 
(compensation) or the coffers of  humanitarian relief  organizations (amelioration).64 States 
may freeze foreign assets only temporarily to compel a target state to abandon unlawful 
practices and furnish appropriate remedies (coercion).65 The scope of  an asset freeze must 
be proportional to a state’s lawful objectives.66 In addition, states ordinarily may not freeze 
frozen assets without first calling upon a target state to satisfy its primary obligations, 
thereby affording a final opportunity for compliance,67 and they may not impose coun-
termeasures if  the target state has initiated independent dispute-resolution procedures.68 
Finally, customary international law does not necessarily support the use of  countermea-
sures in response to all human rights violations; third states may impose countermeasures 
only when confronting especially grave human rights violations such as genocide, slavery, 
or crimes against humanity.69 Thus, the customary law of  countermeasures allows states 
to freeze foreign assets only under limited circumstances and for limited purposes.
While it is generally accepted that a foreign state’s public property is subject to 
countermeasures, BIT protections notwithstanding,70 the same cannot necessarily be 
62 See O.Y. Elegab, The Legality of  Non-forcible Counter-measures in International Law (1988), at 111.
63 See D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, 2005), at 357; Rosenstock and 
Kaplan, ‘Fifty-Third Session of  the International Law Commission’, 96 AJIL (2002) 412, at 414.
64 Although states may use countermeasures to compel a target state to provide compensation as required 
under international law, the customary law of  countermeasures does authorize the confiscation of  for-
eign property for direct compensation or amelioration: see Zoller, supra note 48, at 51.
65 See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Arts. 35, 36, and 49, comment 1; Alland, ‘Countermeasures of  General 
Interest’, 13 EJIL (2002) 1221, at 1226.
66 See, e.g., Gabčikovo-Nagymoros Project, supra note 50, at para. 85 (27 Sept.); Air Services Agreement Case, 
supra note 50, at paras 83, 90 (1978).
67 See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 52(1)(a); Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 50, at 56, para. 84; 
Responsibility of  Germany for Damage Caused in the Portuguese Colonies in the South of  Africa (Portugal v. 
Germany) (‘Naulilaa’), 31 July 1928, 2 RIAA 1011, at 1026. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
recognize, however, that states have not adhered to this requirement when ‘urgent countermeasures’ 
have been viewed as strictly necessary ‘to protect [their] rights’ – as, e.g., when a target state would 
exploit this warning to move extraterritorial assets to positions of  safety: DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 
52. David Bederman has explained that this exception reflects a well-founded concern that ‘certain 
kinds of  countermeasures (such as the freezing of  assets and temporary stay orders) are effective only 
when the opposing state receives no advance notice of  their consideration’: Bederman, ‘Counterintuiting 
Countermeasures’, 96 AJIL (2002) 817, at 825.
68 DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 52(3). Some commentators have argued that the mere availability of  inter-
state dispute settlement procedures in the human rights context is enough to preclude countermeasures: 
see Simma and Pulkoski, ‘Of  Planets and Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law’, 17 EJIL 
(2006) 483, at 526. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility do not endorse this view: see Paparinskis, 
‘Investment Arbitration and the Law of  Countermeasures’, 79 British Yrbk Int’l L (2008) 264, at 304 and 
n. 188.
69 See Dawidowicz, supra note 58, at 347 (noting ‘overwhelming support among commentators and gov-
ernments for the view that only a serious breach of  an erga omnes violation might potentially justify resort 
to third-party countermeasures’).
70 See Paparinskis, supra note 68, at 317–351; see generally Verhoeven, ‘The Law of  Responsibility and 
the Law of  Treaties’, in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson (eds), The Law of  International Responsibility 
(2010), at 105, 111 (‘In principle, a derogation to any treaty can be taken by a countermeasure’).
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said of  private foreign property. As Martins Paparinskis has shown, the relationship 
between countermeasures and private investment is complicated by the fact that the 
rights of  investors ‘under investment protection treaties can be conceptualized either 
as being the rights owed to their home States or rights accruing directly from interna-
tional treaties’.71 If  the former view is correct and investors’ rights are merely deriva-
tive of  state rights under international custom and BITs (as one arbitral tribunal has 
suggested72), then private assets are valid targets for countermeasures. On the other 
hand, if  international custom and BITs grant investors direct rights that are independ-
ent of  state diplomatic protection (as another tribunal has concluded73), then private 
assets arguably are not a valid target for inter-state countermeasures. At present, it is 
unclear which of  these approaches, the derivate-rights theory or direct-rights theory, 
will gain the upper hand in the jurisprudence of  international investment tribunals.
Recent events suggest, however, that an intermediate approach may be emerging 
in state practice. Even if  states generally may not target private foreign assets when 
imposing countermeasures, the intermediate approach suggests that states may freeze 
the private assets of  foreign officials who bear direct responsibility for a target state’s 
internationally wrongful conduct. During the 2011 Arab Spring, for example, the EU 
and the US responded to human rights abuses in Libya, Syria, and Iran by freezing the 
private assets of  public officials who directed or carried out those abuses.74 In each 
of  these settings, the asset freezes were imposed without Security Council authoriza-
tion with the stated purpose of  coercing a foreign state to respect human rights.75 At 
the same time, however, host states took care to emphasize that their countermeas-
ures were designed to have an impact on the target state’s governing ‘regime, not the 
civilian population’.76 In effect, these countermeasures struck a compromise between 
the derivative-rights theory and the direct-rights theory: they preserved direct-rights-
style investment protection for ordinary foreign investors, while treating the private 
property of  regime leaders as constructively ‘public assets’ that were valid targets for 
interstate countermeasures. Further study will be necessary to confirm whether this 
growing body of  state practice meets the generality and opinio juris requirements for 
customary international law. Nonetheless, the early returns suggest that the law of  
countermeasures may be evolving to permit host states to freeze not only the public 
71 Ibid., at 334.
72 See Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID AF Case No. 
ARB/(AF)/04/5, Award, 21 Nov. 2007, at paras 161–180.
73 See Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID AF Case No. ARB/(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15 
Jan. 2008, at paras 161–179.
74 See, e.g., ‘EU To Impose Sanctions on Syrian Officials; UN To Send Team to Daraa’, Haaretz, 6 May 2011 
(discussing EU asset freezes imposed against ‘14 Syrian officials for their part in a violent government 
crackdown against protesters’).
75 See, e.g., Council of  the EU, Press Release, ‘Council Conclusions on Syria’, 14 May 2012, available at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130205.pdf  (Syria); Council 
Reg. 204/2011, OJ (2011) L58/1 (Libya); Exec. Order No. 13606, 22 Apr. 2012 (Syria and Iran); Exec. 
Order No. 13582, 17 Aug. 2011 (Syria); Exec. Order No. 13566, 25 Feb. 2011 (Libya).
76 See Council of  the EU, Press Release 9816/12, ‘Syria: Council Strengthens EU Sanctions Once More’, 14 
May 2012 (quoting EU High Representative Catherine Ashton).
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assets of  rights-abusing states but also, at a minimum, the private assets of  public offi-
cials who orchestrate or carry out a target state’s internationally wrongful conduct.
3. The Law of  Armed Conflict
During armed conflict, customary international law affords a broader menu of  
options for humanitarian financial intervention. As in peacetime, states may use 
counter measures to compel a target state to discontinue and remedy its human rights 
violations (coercion). Additionally, the law of  armed conflict authorizes states at war 
to impose financial measures of  a more intrusive and even permanent character; 
not only may states at war freeze foreign assets to coerce an enemy state, they may 
also appropriate foreign assets temporarily for their own use (‘seizure’) or vest foreign 
assets permanently in their own treasuries (‘confiscation’)77 to advance their ‘military 
objectives’.78 The primary legal constraints on a belligerent state’s authority to impose 
such measures are: (1) the principle of  military necessity, which requires that such 
measures offer ‘a definite military advantage’,79 and (2) the principle of  proportional-
ity, which requires that the resulting impact on a civilian population not be ‘excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’.80
Historically, the law of  armed conflict’s principle of  distinction also played an import-
ant role in regulating belligerent asset freezes. From the 18th century to the early 20th 
century, customary international law permitted states at war to confiscate an enemy 
state’s public assets during wartime, but private assets of  enemy nationals were not subject 
to belligerent confiscation. States could seize private enemy assets during armed conflict 
only on a temporary basis, subject to strict obligations of  restitution or compensation.81
This customary distinction between public and private enemy assets – long considered 
an ‘impregnable rule’ of  customary international law – began to erode during World War 
I as the Allied Powers allowed their nationals to exploit the private investments of  enemy 
nationals for their own gain.82 The Treaty of  Versailles papered over these illegal practices 
by authorizing the Allies ‘to retain and liquidate all the property and interests of  German 
subjects or companies under their control in their territory’ pending Germany’s pay-
ment of  war reparations.83 With the arrival of  World War II, the Allied Nations brazenly 
77 See Santerre, ‘From Confiscation to Contingency Contracting: Property Acquisition on or Near the 
Battlefield’, 124 Military L Rev (1989) 111, at 112.
78 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 Aug. 1949, Relating to the Protection of  Victims 
of  International Armed Conflicts Art. 52(2), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (hereinafter ‘Protocol I’).
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., Art. 51(5). Although proportionality features centrally in both the law of  countermeasures and the 
law of  armed conflict, the focus of  each inquiry is distinct. In the law of  countermeasures, the propor-
tionality principle emphasizes the degree of  coercion necessary to induce a target state to abandon and 
remedy its wrongful conduct. In the law of  armed conflict, on the other hand, proportionality analysis 
is generally understood as balancing a state’s military objectives against countervailing humanitarian 
considerations. See Paparinskis, supra note 68, at 323.
81 See Borchard, ‘Introduction’, in J.A. Gathings, International Law and American Treatment of  Alien Enemy 
Property (1940), at vi.
82 Ibid., at v–vi.
83 Treaty of  Versailles, Art. 297(b) and (e).
 at EJIL m
em








600 EJIL 24 (2013), 583–615
resumed the confiscation of  public and private enemy assets within their jurisdictions 
to ensure ‘that Germany could never again [use] the external assets of  its citizens and 
corporations’ to become an economic superpower on the world stage.84 Although the 
Allies would later contribute substantial sums to Germany’s post-war reconstruction, 
they maintained a firm grip on confiscated private assets within their jurisdictions.85 In 
light of  these developments, some observers concluded in the 1950s that international 
law no longer prohibited the confiscation of  private enemy property during time of  war.86
The past half-century has seen the pendulum swing back towards broader protec-
tion for foreign investment. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Germany 
and Italy (not coincidentally, the targets of  World War II confiscations) introduced 
BIT provisions requiring host states to compensate foreign investors for losses attribut-
able to armed conflicts and civil disturbances. Other influential investor-states such as 
France, the UK, and the US soon followed suit. By the mid-1980s, such ‘armed conflict’ 
provisions had become standard features of  BITs throughout the world.87 Although 
these provisions did not prevent host states from freezing foreign assets during armed 
conflict, they did limit states’ discretion to confiscate frozen assets.
How these BIT provisions relate to the general law of  armed conflict remains 
unclear. One possibility is that these ‘armed conflict’ provisions permit states to seize 
foreign assets during armed conflict but do not permit any form of  belligerent confisca-
tion. Another possibility is that these provisions merely reaffirm (and perhaps regener-
ate) the customary norms that governed foreign investment prior to World War I. If  
this latter understanding is correct, host states that have adopted BIT ‘armed conflict’ 
clauses remain free to confiscate an enemy state’s public assets without compensation 
pursuant to the law of  armed conflict, but they may seize private assets only if  they 
provide compensation to foreign investors. One virtue of  this latter approach is that 
it would harmonize international investment law with standards for the treatment of  
private property under the law of  occupation.88 At present, however, it is impossible to 
predict with confidence which of  these two approaches will prevail.
84 Reeves, ‘Is Confiscation of  Enemy Assets in the National Interest of  the United States?’, 40 Virginia L Rev 
(1954) 1029, at 1043.
85 Ibid., at 1039–1040, 1044–1045; see also O. Schisgall, The Enemy Property Issue (1957), at 4 (observing 
that each Allied Nation agreed to ‘hold or dispose of  German enemy assets within its jurisdiction in man-
ners designed to preclude their return to German ownership or control’ (quoting the Paris Agreement), 
and subsequently agreed never to contest the retention of  these assets).
86 See, e.g., McDougal and Feliciano, ‘International Coercion and World Public Order: The General Principles 
of  the Law of  War’, 67 Yale LJ (1958) 771, at 840; Schisgall, supra note 85, at 8–9; M. Sornarajah, The 
Pursuit of  Nationalized Property (1986), at 299.
87 K.J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation (2010), at 311–315.
88 Both the Hague Regs of  1907 and the Geneva Conventions of  1949 prohibit the confiscation of  private 
property within foreign territory during belligerent occupation: see Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of  War on Land, Art. 46, 18 Oct. 1907, Annex, 1 Bevans 631 (hereinafter ‘Hague Regs IV’); 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Times of  War, Art. 33, 12 Aug. 1949, 
1175 UNTS 287 (hereinafter ‘Geneva Convention IV’). Occupying powers may seize or requisition private 
property within foreign territory under some circumstances, but in such cases they must provide restitution 
or compensation: see Geneva Convention IV, Art. 57; J.S. Pictet (gen. ed.), Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Geneva 
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in Time of  War: Commentary (1960), Arts. 33, 57, 
at 227, 311–312 (noting that the prohibition against pillage ‘leaves intact the right of  requisition or seizure’).
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Some firm conclusions are possible, however, regarding the law of  armed conflict’s 
applications to humanitarian financial intervention. Perhaps most important, when-
ever a state intervenes militarily to promote human rights, international law limits its 
legitimate ‘military objectives’ to the humanitarian needs of  a foreign people. Hence, 
states at war may freeze foreign assets to reduce an enemy state’s capacity to use force 
(incapacitation) and compel its capitulation (coercion). They may also confiscate 
enemy public property and seize private property as necessary to achieve humani-
tarian objectives such as furnishing food or medical assistance within a target state 
(amelioration). The law of  armed conflict would not permit a host state to confiscate 
foreign assets for its own benefit, however, because such action would fall outside the 
scope of  a host state’s legitimate humanitarian objectives. Thus, a host state may not 
confiscate the assets of  a target state to offset the costs of  its own military interven-
tion without express authorization from either the Security Council or the target state 
itself.
Significantly, the law of  armed conflict does not permit states to freeze, seize, or 
confiscate foreign assets as a form of  punishment during humanitarian military 
intervention. For centuries, punitive financial sanctions, like forcible reprisals, 
were a standard feature of  international armed conflict.89 Over time, however, the 
international community has gradually retreated from the idea that states may use 
belligerent confiscation and seizure as tools for meting out punishment against an 
enemy state.90 Some theorists have argued that the turn away from punitive sanc-
tions reflects international law’s commitment to sovereign equality (parem non habet 
imperium).91 Alternatively, punitive sanctions may lack international legal authority 
based on the general principle that no state can be judge and party to the same cause 
(nemo iudex in sua causa),92 or because such measures effectively direct collective 
punishment against a foreign people – a practice that is anathema to contemporary 
international law.93 While the theoretical foundations for this principle may be con-
troversial, however, the principle itself  is not: under the law of  armed conflict, states 
are never authorized to freeze, seize, or confiscate foreign assets for purely punitive 
purposes.
89 See E. de Vattel, The Law of  Nations: Or Principles of  the Law of  Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of  
Nations and Sovereigns (1758) (trans. 1876), at 176.
90 See Basalou, ‘The History of  Reprisals up to 1945: Some Lessons Learned and Unlearned for 
Contemporary International Law’, 49 Military L & L of  War Rev (2010) 335, at 338–341; see generally 
Blum, ‘The Crime and Punishment of  States’, 38 Yale J Int’l L (forthcoming 2013) (‘Since World War 
I, . . . the moral rhetoric of  state “crime and punishment” has been excised from the lexicon of  interna-
tional law’).
91 See Zoller, supra note 48, at 49.
92 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. C.B. Macpherson, 1968) (1651), at 111. By way of  comparison, the WTO 
requires states to obtain authorization before imposing economic retaliation that would otherwise vio-
late their international legal obligations toward target states: see Hathaway and Shapiro, ‘Outcasting: 
Enforcement in Domestic and International Law’, 121 Yale LJ (2011) 252, at 266.
93 See Luban, ‘War as Punishment’, 39 Philosophy & Pub Affairs (2011) 299, at 328 (‘Modern [interna-
tional] law rightly recoils at the idea of  collective punishment’).
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4. Enforcing Judicial Decisions
A fourth strand of  international law that authorizes humanitarian financial interven-
tion is customary law governing the enforcement of  judicial decisions.94 Applying the 
principle of  international comity, states routinely accept the validity of  foreign judi-
cial decisions that freeze, confiscate, or transfer foreign assets. Increasingly, national 
courts have used provisional and plenary remedies such as attachment, garnish-
ment, and sequestration to secure compensation for victims of  human rights abuse.95 
State regulators, in turn, have treated the enforcement of  judicial decisions calling 
for financial intervention as a customary exception to international law’s default pro-
hibition against discriminatory financial intervention. Under international law, state 
regulators are not merely authorized to enforce decisions of  their national courts that 
call for international financial intervention; in many contexts they are required to 
enforce such decisions. Like the other three strands of  international law that author-
ize humanitarian financial intervention, national enforcement of  judicial decisions 
offers a potent mechanism through which states may promote human rights abroad.
In the past, legal publicists have devoted only cursory attention to states’ interna-
tional legal authority to enforce judicial decisions calling for financial intervention, 
and they have not explained how this enforcement authority fits within the broader 
fabric of  public international law. One prominent scholar has characterized the 
enforcement of  judicial decisions as a subset of  international countermeasures,96 
but this assessment misses the mark. When states conduct financial intervention 
to enforce judicial decisions, international law permits them to pursue a variety of  
humanitarian objectives that are not available under the law of  countermeasures 
and the law of  armed conflict. For example, states that enforce judicial decisions may 
provide compensation to successful plaintiffs not only from a defendant state’s public 
assets (to the extent consistent with principles of  foreign sovereign immunity), but 
also from the private assets of  individual foreign defendants. Additionally, states may 
confiscate the private assets of  foreign nationals as a punitive sanction97 – an objective 
94 To the extent that judicial decisions satisfy the standards established by treaty and custom for the law-
ful expropriation of  foreign property, they arguably do not constitute ‘intervention’ under the wrongful 
means theory, though in some instances they might still constitute objectionable ‘intervention’ under the 
anti-subordination theory.
95 See, e.g., Center for Justice and Accountability, ‘Case Summary: Jean v. Dorelien,’ available at: www.cja.org/
article.php?list=type&type=78; Van Schaack, ‘In Defense of  Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of  
Human Rights in the Context of  the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention’, 42 Harvard Int’l LJ (2001) 
141, at 145–147; ‘SA Court Ruling Deals Blow to Mugabe Land Seizures’, ZimOnline, 26 Feb. 2011, avail-
able at: www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=5770.
96 See, e.g., Akehurst, ‘Reprisals by Third States’, 44 British Yrbk Int’l L (1970) 1, at 15–16.
97 Although many countries allow for the punitive confiscation of  private assets in criminal proceedings, 
there is less support for the idea that customary international law would permit punitive financial sanc-
tions in civil or administrative proceedings: see Shelton, supra note 63, at 354–367; Janke and Licari, 
‘Enforcing Punitive Damages in France After Fountaine Pajot’, Am J Comp L (forthcoming); Bowles, et al., 
‘Economic Analysis of  the Removal of  Illegal Gains’, 20 Int’l Rev L & Econ (2000) 537, at 543. Given 
that the US is virtually alone in permitting punitive damages awards against foreign states, it is highly 
questionable whether customary international law supports such a right.
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that is prohibited under the law of  countermeasures.98 Assets confiscated as pun-
ishment vest in the host state’s treasury and may be used for any purposes the host 
state chooses – not solely for humanitarian ends such as compensation or amelio-
ration. While these distinctive features of  the enforcement of  judicial decisions are 
often taken for granted and merit further study, there is considerable evidence that 
the enforcement of  judicial decisions constitutes an independent and distinctive legal 
basis for humanitarian financial intervention.
International law limits national courts’ authority to freeze foreign assets by requir-
ing courts to accord due process to foreign investors. This principle is reflected in the 
venerable customary norm that states may not ‘deny justice’ to foreign nationals 
within their borders.99 Elements of  due process also feature prominently in leading 
HRL and IHL instruments such as the ICCPR, which entitles criminal defendants to 
contest punitive sanctions in a meaningful time and manner before an independent 
and impartial tribunal.100 Both HRL and IHL prohibit collective punishment against 
a group or state by prohibiting courts from punishing defendants without a fair and 
individualized assessment of  culpability.101 These standards reinforce the interna-
tional investment regime’s customary requirement of  fair and equitable treatment, 
guaranteeing basic procedural fairness to foreign investors subject to international 
asset freezes.
C Toward an Integrated Legal Framework
The preceding discussion suggests that the international law of  humanitarian finan-
cial intervention may develop into an integrated legal framework, the details of  which 
will come into sharper focus over time as the international community responds to 
future humanitarian crises. The table below (Table 1) summarizes the key features of  
this emerging legal framework.
Although several international legal regimes authorize asset freezes under prescribed 
conditions, they do not all require states to freeze foreign assets. The only circumstance 
in which states are legally bound to freeze foreign assets is when the Security Council 
or a comparable regional organization imposes mandatory sanctions. Security 
Council resolutions directing states to freeze foreign assets pre-empt state and regional 
measures when these regimes conflict; states must implement the Security Council’s 
directives – adopting the Security Council’s designated humanitarian objectives as 
98 See DARSIWA, supra note 39, Arts 31, 34–39; Shelton, ‘Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on 
State Responsibility’, 96 AJIL (2002) 833, at 844.
99 See J. Paulsson, Denial of  Justice in International Law (2005); A.V. Freeman, The International Responsibility 
of  States for Denial of  Justice (1970).
100 See ICCPR, Art. 14, 999 UNTS 171; Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III) A, UN 
Doc. A/RES/217(III), Art. 10 (10 Dec. 1948) (hereinafter the ‘UDHR’). Although framed in terms of  EC 
law rather than international law, the CJEU’s (then ECJ’s) landmark Kadi case arguably reflects a trend 
towards broader recognition of  an international right to procedural due process in civil and administra-
tive proceedings. See Joined Cases C–402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi v. Council & Commission [2008] ECR 
I–6411.
101 See Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 88, Art. 33; ICCPR, supra note 100, Art. 14.
 at EJIL m
em








604 EJIL 24 (2013), 583–615
their own – even if  this requires them to set aside their own preferred objectives for 
humanitarian financial intervention.102
Some scholars have argued (unpersuasively, in my opinion) that Security Council 
sanctions preclude states and regional organizations from imposing broader asset 
freezes as autonomous countermeasures.103 This thesis is premised on the idea that 
state and regional countermeasures are ‘subsidiary’ to the UN Charter’s collective 
security regime, with the implication that states and regional organizations may 
use countermeasures only if  the Security Council has entirely failed to act. Once the 
Security Council has taken action, these scholars argue, states are no longer free to 
devise their own solutions; the Security Council’s sanctions regime pre-empts further 
state action.104
There are several problems with the field-pre-emption thesis. First, although the 
Charter clearly authorizes the Security Council to establish mandatory financial sanc-
tions,105 ‘nothing in the Charter’s structure or terms suggests that there is an implied 
limitation on the rights of  Member States to take lawful countermeasures where 
the Security Council has acted’.106 Secondly, there is little evidence that the Security 
Council has understood its mandatory sanctions regimes to preclude autonomous 
bilateral countermeasures. Thirdly, a growing body of  state practice – in which the 
Security Council’s permanent members feature prominently – suggests that states do 
not understand Security Council sanctions to preclude broader countermeasures.107 
Fourthly, the field-pre-emption thesis undermines the Security Council’s effectiveness 
102 See, e.g., SC Res. 1483, at paras 22, 23, S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) (temporarily immunizing Iraqi oil 
revenues from legal process and directing states to freeze and transfer Iraqi assets to the UN Development 
Fund for Iraq).
103 See, e.g., Summary Records of  the Meetings of  the 44th Session, [1992] 1 Yrbk Int’l L Comm 144, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992 (statement of  Alain Pellet); Dupont, ‘Countermeasures and Collective 
Security: The Case of  the EU Sanctions Against Iran’, 17 J Conflict & Security L (2012) 301; Sicilianos, 
‘Countermeasures in Response to Grave Violations of  Obligations Owed to the International Community’, 
in Crawford, Pellet, and Olleson, supra note 70, at 1137, 1138.
104 Ibid., at 1142.
105 UN Charter, Art. 39.
106 See Calamita, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear Issue’, 42 Vanderbilt J Transnat’l L 
(2009) 1393, at 1438.
107 See ibid., at 1439–1440; see generally Dawidowicz, supra note 58.
Table 1: Which humanitarian objectives may states pursue through financial intervention? 
Consent Security 
agreements
Countermeasures Armed conflict Judicial 
decisions
Preservation yes yes no no yes
Incapacitation n/a yes no yes± yes
Coercion n/a yes yes* yes± yes
Compensation yes yes no yes± yes
Amelioration yes yes no yes± no
Punishment n/a no+ no no yes**
+ Presumption. * May not apply to private assets. ± Confiscation not permitted for private assets.  ** May not apply to 
public assets.
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by making it easier for target states to move their extraterritorial assets pre-emptively 
in anticipation of  expanded Security Council sanctions. For all of  these reasons, the 
better view is that Security Council resolutions presumptively have only conflict-pre-
emption effect, not field-pre-emption effect.
In the absence of  Security Council action, international law does not provide any stan-
dards for resolving conflicts between the various legal regimes that authorize humani-
tarian financial intervention, nor does it prioritize some humanitarian objectives above 
others. As a result, states that freeze foreign assets for humanitarian purposes often con-
front difficult choices between competing humanitarian objectives. For example, if  a for-
eign head of  state embezzles public funds into a private offshore account, a host state may 
have to choose whether to freeze the assets to ensure their safe return to the foreign state 
(preservation) or use the assets as an inducement to convince the corrupt leader to relin-
quish power (coercion). In other contexts, host states may face a choice between freez-
ing foreign assets to provide remedies to human rights victims (compensation) or using 
the assets to fund post-conflict reconstruction (amelioration). International law commits 
these and other decisions to state discretion, and it allows host states to choose not to freeze 
foreign assets when financial intervention would undermine important national priorities.
D Humanitarian Constraints
Of  course, states and international organizations do not enjoy unfettered discretion to 
choose between the various humanitarian objectives that are permissible under col-
lective-security agreements, the law of  countermeasures, the law of  armed conflict, 
and customary law governing the enforcement of  judicial decisions. As recognized 
in the Naulilaa arbitration, the international community’s response to violations of  
international law must always respect ‘the requirements of  humanity’.108 Today these 
requirements are understood to include the basic protections of  both HRL and IHL.109 
For example, international asset freezes must not jeopardize foreign nationals’ basic 
human rights to food, housing, and essential medical care.110 Even during armed con-
flict, host states must ensure that asset freezes do not cause civilians abroad to suffer 
harm that is excessive in relation to the host state’s humanitarian objectives.111 Under 
the UN Charter, the Security Council likewise bears an obligation to tailor financial sanc-
tions narrowly so as to safeguard ‘economic and social progress and development’;112 
minimize ‘social, health, and related problems’;113 and promote ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all’.114 Thus, whether states ground humanitarian financial 
108 Responsibility of  Germany for Damage, supra note 67, at 1026; cf. Kadi, supra note 100.
109 DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 50(1); Prosecutor v. Kupreškič (Trial Judgment), IT-96-16 (14 Jan. 2000), 
at para. 534.
110 See ICCPR, supra note 100, Art. 6; ICESCR, Arts 11 and 12, 993 UNTS 3; UDHR, supra note 100, Arts. 3, 
5, 25.
111 Protocol I, supra note 78, Art. 51(5)(b).
112 UN Charter, Art. 55(a).
113 Ibid., Art. 55(b).
114 Ibid., Art. 55(c); see also Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of  Human Rights, ‘The 
Adverse Consequences of  Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of  Human Rights’, at para. 28, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (asserting that ‘[s]anctions regimes that lower economic standards, create
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intervention in Security Council authorization or another source they must always 
honour ‘the laws of  humanity and the dictates of  the public conscience’.115
4 Humanitarian Financial Intervention During the 2011 
Libyan Revolution
Having outlined the international law of  humanitarian financial intervention, this sec-
tion applies this emerging legal framework to the international community’s asset freezes 
against Libya during the 2011 Arab Spring. In many respects, this case study illustrates 
how confusion about the legal standards governing humanitarian financial intervention 
has compromised efforts to coordinate multilateral responses to humanitarian crises. 
Throughout the spring and summer of  2011, states advocated a variety of  approaches for 
responding to crimes against humanity in Libya, including financial sanctions designed 
to coerce the Qaddafi regime, preserve assets for a future government, and secure fund-
ing to ameliorate civilian suffering within Libya. While some of  these proposals enjoyed 
a sound grounding in international law, others clearly exceeded states’ legal authority.
A Intervention in Libya
The most recent round of  international financial sanctions against Libya arose against 
the backdrop of  the Arab Spring. Inspired by successful protests in Tunisia and Egypt, 
Libyans staged peaceful demonstrations in several cities in January 2011. The eastern 
port city of  Benghazi soon emerged as the epicentre of  popular unrest as thousands 
of  anti-government protesters flooded the streets to express their grievances against 
the Qaddafi regime.
Colonel Qaddafi’s response to these peaceful protests was swift and brutal. 
Government artillery, helicopter gunships, and snipers fired upon protesters in 
Benghazi and neighbouring towns, while ‘thugs armed with hammers and swords’ 
reportedly ‘attacked families in their homes’.116 Heavy gunfire also greeted peaceful 
demonstrators in Tripoli.117 Witnesses reported ‘death squads of  foreign mercenaries’ 
roving the streets to silence residents who ventured outside their homes.118
health problems or are detrimental to the observance of  human rights would violate Article 55’ of  the 
UN Charter). Over the past decade, the SC has taken care to tailor its financial sanctions narrowly in 
order to preserve target states’ capacity to meet essential ‘basic expenses’ such as the provision of  food, 
housing, and medical care: see, e.g., SC Res. 1718, at para. 9(a), UN Doc. S/RES/1718 (14 Oct. 2006).
115 Institut de droit international, ‘Régime des représailles en temps de paix’ (19 Oct. 1934), 38 Annuaire 
de l’Institut de droit international 710, Art. 6(4), quoted in Borelli and Olleson, ‘Obligations Relating to 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, in Crawford, Pellet, and Olleson, supra note 70, at 1177, 1177.
116 Meo, ‘Libya Protests: 140 “Massacred” as Gaddafi Sends in Snipers To Crush Dissent’, Daily Telegraph, 20 
Feb. 2011, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8335934/
Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-crush-dissent.html.
117 ‘Libya: Worshippers “fired on” after prayers in Tripoli’, BBC News Middle East, 25 Feb. 2011, available at: 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12586099.
118 Chrisafis and Black, ‘After the Air Raids, Gaddafi’s Death Squads Keep Blood on Tripoli’s Streets’, Guardian, 
22 Feb. 2011, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/22/air-raids-gaddafi-tripoli.
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Fearing a further escalation of  violence against Libyan civilians, the interna-
tional community imposed asset freezes and other non-forcible sanctions against the 
Qaddafi regime. On 25 February 2011, the US froze the accounts of  select Libyan 
governmental agencies, instrumentalities, and state-controlled entities, as well as the 
personal assets of  Qaddafi, his immediate family, and other senior government offi-
cials.119 The following day, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1970, condemning ‘the gross and systematic violation of  human rights’ against civil-
ians in Libya and expressing concern that the Qaddafi government’s ‘widespread and 
systematic attacks . . . against the civilian population may amount to crimes against 
humanity’.120 The Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor 
of  the International Criminal Court121 and imposed mandatory sanctions, including 
a targeted asset freeze directed against Qaddafi family members.122 On 28 February 
2011, the Council of  the EU reported that it had complied with Resolution 1970 and 
would impose its own supplemental ‘autonomous measures’, including asset freezes 
against 20 Libyan officials whom the EU believed were individually responsible for vio-
lence against Libyan civilians.123 By the end of  the summer, states throughout the 
world had frozen Libyan assets in compliance with the Security Council’s directive.124
With asset freezes in place and violence in Libya escalating by the hour, it was not 
long before the international community’s focus shifted toward military intervention. 
When insurgents in Benghazi seized control over territory in eastern Libya, inter-
national observers began to fear the prospect of  a prolonged and savage civil war. 
Qaddafi took to the airwaves promising ‘a long-drawn-out war with no limits’ and 
declared that his forces would ‘fight until the last man’.125 In response to these threats, 
the Security Council authorized UN member states ‘to take all necessary measures’ to 
enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated areas 
under threat of  attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi’.126 Assisted 
by NATO airstrikes, insurgents under the direction of  the Benghazi-based TNC gradu-
ally extended their control westward, capturing one coastal town after another until 
they reached Tripoli in late August and killed Qaddafi himself  two months later.
As the civil war in Libya unfolded, the country’s frozen extraterritorial assets grew to 
staggering proportions. By 25 August 2011, experts estimated that the total value of  
Libya’s frozen assets had reached US$160 billion,127 including $29 billion sequestered 
in a single US bank.128 Libya’s sovereign wealth fund, the Libyan Investment Authority 
119 Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75.
120 SC Res. 1970, supra note 6, preamble.
121 Ibid., at paras 4–8.
122 Ibid., at paras 17–21 and Annex II.
123 Council Dec. 2011/137/CFSP, 28 Feb. 2011, Art. 6(1)(b), Annex IV, OJ (2011) L58/1.
124 See, e.g. Mansour, ‘Algeria Freezes Khadafi Assets’, magharebia.com, 8 June 2011, available at: www.
magharebia.com/ cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2011/06/08/feature-06.
125 ‘Libya: The Fall of  Gaddafi’, BBC News Africa, 11 Oct. 2011, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-13860458.
126 SC Res. 1973, supra note 7, at paras 4, 6, 8.
127 See Meyers & Balefsky, supra note 3.
128 O’Harrow & Grimaldi, supra note 15.
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(known by its Arabic title as ‘the mother of  all funds’), accounted for approximately 
$70 billion alone.129 The more state regulators searched, the further Libya’s invest-
ments were found to extend, including major stakes in Africa’s only communications 
satellite, RASCOM; Africa’s only continent-wide radio station, Africa No. 1; influential 
British publisher Pearson, the parent company of  the Financial Times; the Italian soc-
cer club Juventus; and a diverse portfolio of  luxury hotels, high-rise apartment build-
ings, farms, banks, mining interests, and petrol stations scattered across the globe.130 
Investigators speculated that they might recover another $80 billion as they contin-
ued to ferret out the previous regime’s hidden investments.131
As the TNC consolidated its control over Libya and worked toward the formation of  
a new government, the Security Council gradually narrowed its mandatory sanctions 
during the late summer and autumn of  2011. In mid-August, the Security Council’s 
Sanctions Committee for Libya began authorizing humanitarian exceptions to allow 
frozen assets to be used for humanitarian aid, as contemplated in Resolution 1970.132 
By 26 September 2011, these exceptions allowed host states to unfreeze roughly 
$16 billion in Libyan assets to address ‘basic needs’ of  the Libyan people.133 On 16 
December 2011, the Sanctions Committee scaled back its asset freeze even further 
by permitting states to release assets of  the Central Bank of  Libya (Central Bank) and 
the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) while maintaining mandatory sanctions over 
other investment vehicles that were believed to be under the continuing control of  the 
Qaddafi family.134 Within a matter of  days, states throughout the world had pledged to 
unfreeze the full assets of  the Central Bank and LAFB – approximately $100 billion – 
and release these funds expeditiously to the TNC.135 Despite these pledges, the unfreez-
ing and unwinding of  Libya’s extraterritorial assets proved to be a lengthy process. By 
mid-Spring 2012, the vast bulk of  Libya’s extraterritorial assets remained under the 
control of  foreign states.
129 Carste and Leftly, ‘Prosecutors Fly to Libya To Freeze Gaddafi’s Swiss Assets’, Independent, 23 Oct. 2011, 
available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/prosecutors-fly-to-libya-to-freeze-gaddafis-
swiss-assets-2374512.html.
130 See ibid.; Faul, ‘Libyan Assets in Africa Far-Reaching, Little Known’, ABC News, 11 June 2011, avail-
able at: http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=13818183; Liberto, ‘Libya Set To Get Back $37 
Billion from US’, CNNMoney, 20 Oct. 2011, available at: http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/
economy/Libyan_assets/index.htm.
131 Carste and Leftly, supra note 129.
132 See, e.g., ‘Netherlands Unfreezes Libyan Assets for Medical Supplies’, reliefweb, 16 Aug. 2011, available at: 
http://reliefweb.int/node/441104; US Draft Resolution (Provisional), S/2011/535, 24 Aug. 2011, avail-
able at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
Libya%20S%202011%20535.pdf.
133 SC Res. 1970, supra note 6, at para. 19(a); see generally UN SCOR, 6622nd Meeting, at 5, UN Doc. S/
PV.622 (26 Sept. 2011) (statement of  Sanctions Committee Chair José Filipe Moraes Cabral).
134 SC Committee Established Pursuant to Res. 1970 (2011) Concerning Libya, List of  Individuals Subject 
to the Measures Imposed by Para. 15 of  Res. 1970 (2011) (the Travel Ban) and/or Para. 17 of  Res. 1970 
(2011) or Para. 19 of  Res. 1973 (2011) (the Asset Freeze), at 7–8, 16 Dec. 2011, available at: www.
un.org/sc/committees/1970/pdf/List%20of%20Individuals%20and%20Entities.pdf.
135 ‘Libya: US$100b Libyan Assets Defrozen, Says Finance Minister’, Libya-Business News, 20 Dec. 2011, avail-
able at: www.libya-businessnews.com/2011/12/20/libya-us100b-libyan-assets-defrozen-says-finance- 
minister.
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B Freezing Assets Before Resolution 1970
From the earliest days of  the Libyan revolution, the international community con-
fronted challenging legal issues concerning Libya’s extraterritorial assets. An important 
preliminary question involved the legality of  unilateral asset freezes imposed by the US 
and the EU. While few international lawyers questioned the Security Council’s authority 
to impose mandatory multilateral asset freezes pursuant Chapter VII of  the UN Charter, 
the legality of  unilateral third-state asset freezes remained somewhat murky. Did inter-
national law authorize the US to freeze Libyan assets before the Security Council issued 
Resolution 1970? Did the US and the EU satisfy international law when they later 
extended ‘autonomous measures’ beyond the scope of  Resolutions 1970 and 1973?
The US must have relied upon the customary law of  countermeasures when it froze 
Libyan assets prior to Resolution 1970. Other potential bases for financial intervention 
– Security Council authorization, the law of  armed conflict, and custom governing the 
enforcement of  judicial decisions – were not plausibly in play at the time.136 Construed 
as a third-party countermeasure, the US’ unilateral asset freeze was a permissible 
response to the Libyan government’s flagrant violation of  its erga omnes obligations to 
refrain from war crimes and crimes against humanity.137 US action may have been jus-
tified, as well, to preserve public funds obtained by the Qaddafi family through corrup-
tion (under the principle of  tacit consent) and to coerce the Qaddafi family to return 
misappropriated public funds (as a countermeasure).138 Although the asset freeze did 
not succeed in convincing the Qaddafi regime to cease violating its obligations erga 
omnes, the US’ humanitarian objectives were consistent with international law.
Some might question whether international law would permit the US to freeze the 
private assets of  Qaddafi loyalists rather than limit countermeasures to public assets 
of  the Libyan state. As discussed previously, at least one international arbitral tri-
bunal has construed international investment law to confer direct rights on private 
investors, precluding host states from freezing private assets under the law of  coun-
termeasures.139 This article has argued, however, that the recent practice of  the EU 
136 When international asset freezes commenced in 2011, no BIT was in force between the US and Libya, 
although the two countries had concluded a general framework agreement to structure future discussion 
about trade and investment.
137 See Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75 (finding that the Qaddafi regime had ‘us[ed] weapons of  
war, mercenaries, and wanton violence against unarmed civilians’); Tams, supra note 50, at 144–145 
(observing that ‘war crimes and crimes against humanity . . . are often considered to give rise to obliga-
tions erga omnes’).
138 President Obama’s executive order authorizing asset freezes against Libya stressed the ‘serious risk that 
Libyan state assets will be misappropriated by Qadhafi, members of  his government, members of  his fam-
ily, or his close associates’: Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75 (emphasis added). If  the US feared that 
Qaddafi family members would misappropriate state assets at some point in the future, the law of  counter-
measures would not permit intervention until that wrong occurred. See the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 
supra note 50, at 55, para. 83; DARSIWA, supra note 39, Art. 49(1). Countermeasures arguably would 
be permissible, however, to compel Qaddafi loyalists to return state assets obtained previously through 
public corruption.
139 See Corn Products, supra note 73, Decision on Responsibility, 15 Jan. 2008, at paras 161–179. On this 
theory, the US would have to show that frozen assets were, in fact, state assets misappropriated from the 
Libyan people.
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and the US (including asset freezes against the Qaddafi regime) may reflect the emer-
gence of  a new customary norm, one that would allow host states to freeze the private 
assets of  foreign officials who contribute directly to their state’s international wrongs. 
Assuming that this suggestion is correct, the US was free to freeze the private assets 
of  Libyan officials as necessary to compel the Qaddafi regime to abandon its crimes 
against humanity.
C Freezing Assets After Resolution 1970
The day after the US imposed its preliminary asset freeze, some of  the legal issues 
raised by unilateral US action were mooted by Resolution 1970, which approved the 
US’ list of  targets and appointed an international sanctions committee to make fur-
ther designations pursuant to Chapter VII of  the UN Charter. The Security Council’s 
financial intervention raised another important question, however: did Resolution 
1970 pre-empt autonomous measures by individual states and regional organiza-
tions (field-pre-emption) or did it merely impose minimum requirements that states 
and regional organizations could supplement with more robust measures of  their own 
(conflict-pre-emption)? If  field-pre-emption applied, the US would have to await fur-
ther Security Council authorization before it could expand its asset freeze. Field-pre-
emption would also call into question subsequent autonomous measures by Canada 
and the EU – asset freezes that exceeded the scope of  Resolutions 1970 and 1973.140
The better view is that the Security Council’s mandatory sanctions did not preclude 
Canada, the EU, and the US from imposing broader asset freezes under the law of  
countermeasures. As discussed previously, neither the text of  the UN Charter nor state 
practice suggests that Security Council sanctions automatically pre-empt autono-
mous state or regional countermeasures. Moreover, the broader asset freezes imposed 
by Canada, the EU, and the US supported the Security Council’s coercive humanitar-
ian objectives and prevented the Qaddafi regime from moving assets to evade future 
Security Council sanctions. Given the scale of  the Qaddafi regime’s human rights 
abuses, it would be difficult to argue that those measures were disproportionate. Thus, 
there are good reasons to believe that international law permitted Canada, the EU, 
and the US to impose asset freezes against Libya that were broader than the Security 
Council’s mandatory sanctions regime.
D Unfreezing Assets without Security Council Authorization
Once asset freezes had been imposed against Libya, it was not long before states began 
to consider whether they could unfreeze and transfer Libyan assets to the TNC with-
out Security Council authorization. Beginning in March 2011, TNC representatives 
urged the international community to allow them to access Libya’s frozen assets or 
140 See, e.g., Council Reg. 204/2011, supra note 75; Council Implementing Reg. 272/2011, OJ (2011) 
L76/32; Council Implementing Reg. 288/2011, OJ (2011) L78/13; Council Reg. 572/2011, OJ (2011) 
L159/2; Exec. Order No. 13566, supra note 75, at paras 1–2; Statement by the Prime Minister of  Canada 
on Implementing Sanctions Against Libya, 27 Feb. 2011, available at: www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.
asp?id=3997.
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use those assets as collateral for loans or lines of  credit.141 The TNC argued that it 
needed a prompt infusion of  cash to sustain its military campaign against forces loyal 
to Colonel Qaddafi.142 Further, it insisted that civilians would be without food, medi-
cal care, and essential public services if  the international community did not release 
Libya’s frozen assets immediately.143
By late summer, several states had answered the TNC’s plea for assistance. France, 
Italy, and Turkey recognized the TNC as Libya’s legitimate government and took steps 
to lift restrictions on Libya’s frozen assets. Italy extended a line of  credit to the TNC 
using frozen Libyan funds as collateral.144 France and Turkey released frozen assets to 
the TNC in early August.145
The trouble with these measures was that the Security Council had yet to lift its 
mandatory sanctions.146 Although other states expressed sympathy for the TNC’s 
grave financial situation, and some publicly considered taking steps similar to those 
of  France, Italy, and Turkey,147 most concluded in the end that their ‘hands were tied 
by United Nations sanctions’.148 Among these more restrained states, Russia was 
141 See Johnson et al., ‘US, Libyan Rebels Discuss Aid’, Wall St J, 25 May 2011, available at: http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052748704681904576317482124716992.html.
142 See Wan and Booth, ‘United States Recognizes Libyan Rebels as Legitimate Government’, Washington Post, 
15 July 2011, available at: articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-15/world/35237622_1_rebel-coun-
cil-libyan-rebel-mahmoud-shammam; Raghavan and Grimaldi, ‘Libyans “Robbed Our Own Bank” To 
Fund Uprising’, Washington Post, 24 May 2011, available at: articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-24/
world/35233273_1_ali-tarhouni-libyan-assets-rebel-leaders.
143 See Squires, ‘Libyan Rebels Receive £1.8 Billion Trust Fund’, Daily Telegraph, 4 May 2011, available 
at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8492745/Libyan-rebels-to-
receive-1.8-billion-trust-fund.html.
144 Press Release, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, ‘Focus Libya: Frattini in Benghazi, memorandum of  
understanding with the TNC’, 31 May 2011, available at: www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/
ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2011/05/20110531_FocusLibia_memorandum.htm (hereinafter 
‘Frattini in Benghazi’).
145 Vesnovskaya, ‘UN – No Authority for Paris’, Voice of  Russia, 2 Aug. 2011, available at: http://english.
ruvr.ru/2011/08/02/54098751.html; Nawar, ‘France Passes $259 Million Frozen Libyan Assets to 
Opposition Forces’, YallaFinance, 4 Aug. 2011, available at: http://yallafinance.com/2011/08/04/
france-passes-259-million-frozen-libyan-assets-to-opposition-forces/; ‘Turkey, France Unfreeze Libyan 
Assets’, Magharebia, 2 Aug. 2011, available at: www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/
features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2011/08/02/newsbrief-02.
146 The SC did create a humanitarian safety-valve by providing an institutional mechanism whereby Libya’s 
frozen funds could be unlocked to address shortages in food, medical treatment, and housing: SC Res. 
1970, supra note 6, at para. 19(a). Res. 1970 allowed for such action, however, only ‘after notification 
by the relevant State to the [Sanctions] Committee’ and ‘in the absence of  a negative decision by the 
Committee within five working days’: ibid. Persistent opposition from South Africa (a veto-wielding mem-
ber of  the Sanctions Committee) rendered this humanitarian exception inoperative until mid-Aug. 2011.
147 See Clark, ‘Canada Mulls Ways To Fund Libyan Rebels with Frozen Gadhafi Assets’, Globe & Mail, 15 July 
2011; ‘Brüderle Wants Libya’s Assets for Relief  Aid’, Local, 16 Apr. 2011, available at: www.thelocal.
de/national/20110416-34437.html(Germany); Mackenzie and Noueihed, ‘Anti-Gaddafi Allies Offers 
Rebels Cash Lifeline’, Reuters, 5 June 2011, available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/05/uk-
libya-idUKLDE71Q0MP20110505 (US).
148 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, ‘Canada Unfreezing $2.2B in Libyan Assets’, CBC News, 13 Sept. 2011, available at: 
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/story/2011/09/13/pol-baird-libya-update.html.
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the most outspoken critic of  unilateral action, stridently condemning the release of  
Libyan assets to the TNC as ‘absolutely illegal’.149
Even with the benefit of  hindsight, it remains unclear whether France, Italy, and 
Turkey satisfied international law when they unfroze Libyan assets without Security 
Council authorization. Contrary to Russia’s protestations, Resolutions 1970 and 1973 
did not, in fact, declare that any efforts to thaw Libyan assets for the TNC’s benefit would 
be ‘absolutely illegal’. On the other hand, these resolutions did not give host states a 
blank checque to unfreeze any Libyan assets they wished for humanitarian purposes, 
as some diplomats suggested at the time.150 Properly understood, the scope of  a state’s 
discretion to unfreeze Libyan assets turned upon which legal regime – Security Council 
sanctions or the law of  countermeasures – governed particular frozen assets. To the 
extent that Resolutions 1970 and 1973 applied, states that released or collateralized 
Libyan assets without express authorization from the Security Council’s sanctions com-
mittee violated their obligations under the UN Charter.151 Conversely, states were free 
to dissolve their autonomous asset freezes as soon as they determined that the coercive 
objectives of  these measures had been achieved.152 Thus, if  it turns out that the assets 
unfrozen by France, Italy, and Turkey were not subject to mandatory Security Council 
resolutions, these assets could be released to the TNC as the re cognized ‘legitimate gov-
ernment’ of  Libya without further Security Council action.153
Unfortunately, press accounts do not indicate whether the specific assets involved in 
these incidents were covered by Resolutions 1970 and 1973. If  the assets did, indeed, fall 
within the ambit of  the Security Council’s mandatory financial sanctions, any attempt to 
thaw these assets would have been ‘absolutely illegal’ from the perspective of  international 
law. On the other hand, if  the assets under consideration were subject only to autonomous 
countermeasures at the time, customary international law would have permitted France, 
Italy, and Turkey to release or collateralize those assets for the benefit of  the Libyan people.
E Using Frozen Assets for Other Purposes
When the Security Council loosened its mandatory financial sanctions towards the 
end of  2011, states gradually made Libyan assets available to the TNC. This process 
149 Vesnovskaya, supra note 145 (Russia). Turkey condemned France’s unilateral unfreezing of  Libyan assets 
in July, then took similar measures less than a month later: see Küçükkoşum, ‘Libyan Rebels Ask Turkey 
for Access to Frozen Assets’, Hurriyet Daily News, 6 July 2011, available at: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
default.aspx?pageid=438&n=libyan-rebels-ask-turkey-for-access-to-frozen-assets-2011-07-06.
150 See ‘Brüderle Wants Libya’s Assets for Relief  Aid’, supra note 147.
151 The fact that France, Italy, and Turkey had recognized the TNC previously as the ‘legitimate government’ 
of  Libya was irrelevant for these purposes because Res. 1970 and 1973 did not provide for the SC’s sanc-
tions to be lifted by unilateral state action under such circumstances.
152 See, e.g., Office of  Foreign Asset Control, General License No. 7a, General License with Respect to the 
Libyan Oil Company and its Subsidiaries, 31 CFR 570, 19 Sept. 2011, available at: www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/libya2_gl7a.pdf.
153 As Stefan Talmon has observed, prior to the TNC achieving recognition as the de jure ‘government’ of  
Libya, the Qaddafi government remained ‘the only authority’ with a valid legal claim to access and 
‘legally dispose of  Libyan State assets abroad’ once the assets were unfrozen: Talmon, ‘Recognition of  
the Libyan Transitional National Council’, 15 ASIL Insight, 16 June 2011, available at: www.asil.org/
insights110616.cfm.
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was preceded, however, by months of  political wrangling over proposals to dispose 
of  the assets in other ways. Some states considered using frozen assets to purchase 
arms and supplies for Libyan insurgents.154 In the US, members of  Congress debated 
confiscating Libyan assets to offset the costs of  American military action.155 Other pol-
icymakers advocated linking the release of  ‘frozen assets to Libyan cooperation with 
investigations into Gadhafi-era terrorist attacks’.156 While none of  these proposals was 
ultimately put into practice, they reflect the uncertain fate of  Libya’s frozen assets at 
the height of  the Libyan revolution.
Many of  the proposals that circulated during this period were inconsistent with 
Resolution 1970, which anticipated that frozen Libyan assets should be preserved to 
ensure that they would, ‘at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and 
for the benefit of  the people of  [Libya]’.157 Had the Security Council not required the 
return of  frozen assets to Libya, international law would have permitted host states to 
continue to freeze Libyan assets for other purposes, such as to compel Libya to inves-
tigate and provide remedies for past acts of  state-sponsored terrorism (under the law 
of  countermeasures)158 or to satisfy civil or criminal judgments against the Libyan 
government or designated Libyan officials. Such measures would have been permis-
sible as long as they satisfied the general humanitarian standards of  HRL and IHL. On 
the other hand, states would have lacked authority to confiscate Libyan assets for their 
own use without authorization from the Security Council, an appropriate court, or the 
Libyan government. Under no circumstances would the law of  countermeasures have 
allowed host states to confiscate and vest Libyan assets in their own treasuries. While 
it might be tempting to conclude that the law of  armed conflict would authorize coali-
tion states to confiscate Libyan assets, the facts on the ground do not support this the-
sis. At the Security Council’s direction, coalition forces played a narrowly defined role 
during the Libyan revolution, providing only air support and intelligence to insurgent 
forces.159 Given the grave humanitarian needs of  the Libyan people and the limited 
engagement of  coalition forces, confiscating frozen Libyan assets to offset the costs of  
coalition intervention could not reasonably be considered necessary and proportional 
under the law of  armed conflict. To be sure, had the Security Council not directed that 
states return frozen assets to the TNC, states that recognized the TNC as the legitimate 
government of  Libya could have used frozen assets to purchase arms for insurgents or 
fuel for their own aircraft with the TNC’s freely bestowed consent. Absent such con-
sent from the TNC or the Security Council, however, states that supplied arms and air 
support to the TNC would have lacked legal authority to confiscate Libyan assets to 
offset the costs of  their military intervention.
154 See Global Civilians for Peace in Libya, supra note 4 (citing Russia’s concerns that France would take this 
action).
155 See Liberto, supra note 130.
156 Ibid. (citing a Congressional Research Report dated 29 Sept. 2011).
157 SC Res. 1970, supra note 6, at para. 20.
158 DARSIWA, supra note 39, Arts. 35–37.
159 See SC Res. 1973, supra note 7, at para. 4.
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F Delaying the Release of  Frozen Assets
By the end of  December 2011, most of  Libya’s offshore assets were no longer subject 
to mandatory Security Council sanctions, and states had announced plans to release 
over US$100 billion dollars to the TNC. Despite these developments, the thawing and 
delivery of  frozen assets to the TNC proceeded slowly.160 Publicly, some states expressed 
concern that unfrozen assets might not reach the TNC securely. Privately, states prob-
ably questioned whether Libya’s new transitional government could be trusted to hus-
band the country’s resources prudently for the benefit of  the Libyan people. As time 
progressed, continuing delays in the release of  frozen assets became a point of  friction 
in relations between the TNC and foreign governments.
As a matter of  international law, a strong case can be made that host states were 
entitled to maintain their asset freezes until the TNC provided adequate assurances that 
it would respect, protect, and fulfil human rights for the Libyan people. Throughout 
the spring of  2012, Libya had yet to install a permanent national government capable 
of  guaranteeing stability within the country, and sporadic violence continued to arise 
between Qaddafi loyalists, local militias, and security forces under the TNC’s com-
mand. Although the Security Council stressed that Libyan assets should return ‘as 
soon as possible,’ it also emphasized the ‘importance of  making these assets available 
in a transparent and responsible manner in conformity with the needs and wishes of  
the Libyan people’, and it underscored the TNC’s obligations to ‘protect Libya’s popu-
lation, restore government services, and allocate Libya’s funds openly and transpar-
ently’.161 Given Libya’s history of  authoritarianism and corruption, host states had 
good reason to proceed with caution, as directed by the Security Council. Indeed, even 
TNC leaders expressed concern that thawing assets too rapidly could enable Qaddafi 
loyalists to access and liquidate frozen accounts.162 Thus, international law permitted 
host states to proceed cautiously with the unfreezing of  Libyan assets, taking care to 
ensure that all frozen assets would return to the people of  Libya in an orderly manner 
through a credible and rights-respecting Libyan government.
5 Conclusion
If  there is one lesson to be drawn from recent debates over the international commu-
nity’s financial intervention in Libya, it is that the legal standards governing humani-
tarian financial intervention remain poorly understood. Although the international 
community uses asset freezes regularly as a mechanism for promoting human rights 
160 See Quinton, ‘Obama to Congress: Sanctions on Libya Will Continue’, National J, 23 Feb. 2012, avail-
able at: www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/obama-to-congress-sanctions-on-libya-will-con-
tinue-20120223#.T0aF2XNo-tw.twitter; ‘Libya Given $20 Bln of  Freed Assets’, Libya-Business News, 10 
Jan. 2012, available at: www.libya-businessnews.com/2012/01/10/libya-given-20-bln-of-freed-assets.
161 SC Res. 2009, pmbl and para. 5, S/RES/2009 (16 Sept. 2011).
162 See Richter, ‘Western Allies Move Cautiously on Libyan Assets’, LA Times, 2 Aug. 2011, available at: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/02/world/la-fg-libya-money-20110802 (noting that the TNC’s 
envoy to the US and an unnamed seniorUSofficialshared these concerns).
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around the world, states and international organizations rarely define their humani-
tarian objectives with precision. Equally troubling, the legal standards that govern 
international asset freezes have developed in a fragmented and piecemeal fashion, 
with scant attention being paid to the integrity and coherence of  this field of  interna-
tional law as a whole.
To address these concerns, this article has endeavoured to illuminate the humani-
tarian objectives and legal standards that govern international financial intervention. 
The legal framework developed in this article should prove useful as host states consider 
whether international law would permit them to freeze foreign assets in response to 
human rights abuses abroad. Equally important, the typology of  humanitarian objec-
tives outlined in this article should enable host states and international organizations 
to articulate their objectives more clearly when they freeze foreign assets to promote 
human rights. International asset freezes will often serve coercive purposes, compel-
ling states to honour their international human rights obligations. But when coercion 
fails (as was the case in Libya), asset freezes may still advance important humanitar-
ian objectives such as incapacitation, compensation, or amelioration. Whether host 
states may pursue any particular humanitarian objective in a given context depends 
upon the interplay between several distinct international legal regimes: international 
investment law, customary principles of  non-intervention, collective-security agree-
ments such as the UN Charter, the customary law of  countermeasures, the law of  
armed conflict, and international custom governing the enforcement of  judicial deci-
sions. Whenever states impose asset freezes to promote human rights abroad, they 
must take care to pursue only those discrete humanitarian objectives that are consist-
ent with international law.
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